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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
to be pre-empted without a clearer determination of congressional
policy than we find here." 66 The Supreme Court's statement of five
years ago still seems relevant: "The ... Act ... leaves much to the
states, though Congress has refrained from telling us how much. We
must spell out from conflicting indications of congressional will the
area in which state action is still permissible." 67
V
MODIFICATION AND DISCHARGE OF CLAIM.S IN NEW YORK
The field of modification and discharge of claims in New York
is today unsettled I despite the fact that the common-law doctrines
have been largely superseded by statutes. 2 This note will point out
the common-law doctrines, the statutory changes, and the areas in
which the common law has been left untouched. The subjects herein
considered include modification, release, and accord and satisfaction.
Rescission
A contract may be terminated by rescission. If the parties to
an existing contract, either orally or by a writing mutually agree to
terminate their duties under it, they have rescinded it.3 Neither party
is then under any duty to perform his part of the contract.4 Each
promise, in the case of a bilateral contract, provides the necessary con-
sideration.5 Termination may be effected even if the parties immedi-
ately enter into a new contract on almost identical terms.6 Today the
66 Id. at 646.
617 Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 488 (1953).
1 See, e.g., Yonkers Fur Dressing Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 247 N.Y. 435,
160 N.E. 778 (1928); Langlois v. Langlois, 5 A.D.2d 75, 169 N.Y.S.2d 170
(3d Dep't 1957); Pape v. Rudolph Bros., Inc., 257 App. Div. 1032, 13 N.Y.S.2d
781 (4th Dep't 1939) (per curiam), aff'd mern., 282 N.Y. 692, 26 N.E.2d 817
(1940); Armour & Co. v. Schlacter, 159 N.Y.S.2d 135 (County Ct. 1957).
2 See, e.g., N.Y. DEBT. & CR . LAw § 243; N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §§ 33(2),
33-a, 33-b, 33-c.
35 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1236 '(1951).
4bid.
5 RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 406, comment a (1932). The term "aban-
donment" has been used interchangeably with rescission, and the effects are
the same. See Rodgers v. Rodgers, 235 N.Y. 408, 139 N.E. 557 (1923).
6 Schwartzreich v. Bauman-Basch, Inc., 231 N.Y. 196, 131 N.E. 887 (1921).
As between a modification of a contract and an abandonment of it "very little
difference* may appear. . . . There is . . . a marked difference in principle.
Where the new contract gives any new privilege or advantage to the promisee,
a consideration has been recognized, though in the main it is the same contract."
Id. at 203, 131 N.E. at 889.
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parties may so abandon any contract, even orally, with but one ex-
ception which will be treated later.7
Modification
If the parties prefer merely to modify the contract, consideration
is needed.8  The promise of each of the parties to forego a portion
of his rights under the contract constitutes sufficient consideration, 9
but sufficient consideration is lacking if the attempted modification
agreement only changes the duties of one of the parties.Y0 Today,
by statute, the parties can effect a modification even if consideration
is lacking, provided the modification agreement is reduced to writing.,'
At common law, an oral modification of an unsealed written
contract was valid ' 2 even if the contract contained an express pro-
vision that it could not be orally modified. 1 3  The theory was that
"those who make a contract, may unmake it. The clause which for-
bids a change, may be changed like any other. The prohibition of
oral waiver, may itself be waived." 14 If, however, the contract was
under seal, it could not be modified orally.15 However, a partially
executed modification will be enforced. 16
In 1941, the legal effect of the seal was abolished in New York
except as otherwise expressly provided by statute.17 At the same
time, section 33-c of the New York Personal Property Law was
enacted.' 8 This section prohibits an executory oral agreement from
changing, modifying, or discharging a written contract which con-
tains a prohibition against oral change. The statute was designed to
furnish to contracting parties the same protection against possible
fraudulent modification that had existed previously by sealed con-
tracts.19  It was essentially a "barrier against fraud." 20 Moreover,
7 See text accompanying note 30 infra.
8 Cohen v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Acc. Ass'n of America, 47 N.Y.S.2d
402 (Sup. Ct. 1944) ; see Note, 14 ALBANY L. REv. 186, 189 (1950).
9 6 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTs § 1826 (rev. ed. 1938).
10 Ibid.
11 N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 33(2).
12 See Bandman v. Finn, 185 N.Y. 508, 78 N.E. 175 (1906) (dictum).
13 Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N.Y. 380, 122 N.E. 378
(1919).
14 Id. at 387, 122 N.E. at 381.
15 Cammack v. J. B. Slattery & Bro., Inc., 241 N.Y. 39, 148 N.E. 781
(1925); Cohen v. Jaffe, 218 App. Div. 259, 218 N.Y. Supp. 135 (4th Dep't
1926).
16 Ibid.
17 Laws of N.Y. 1941, c. 329, § 2.
I8 Laws of N.Y. 1941, c. 329, § 5. For an application of this statute, see
Martens v. General Foods Corp., 276 App. Div. 1053, 96 N.Y.S.2d 330 (4th
Dep't 1950) (mem. opinion).
10 1941 LEG. Doc. No. 65(M), REPORT, N.Y. LAW REVISION COMMISSION
.345, 401-02 (1941); see also 36 CORNELL L.Q. 131, 132 (1950).
20 Legislation, 27 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 171, 174 (1952).
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under a sealed contract, while the parties had precluded themselves
from orally modifying,21 this preclusion was perhaps unknown and
unwanted. The presence of the seal did not expressly indicate to the
parties the prohibition against oral modification.22 But before section
33-c can be invoked, the contract itself must contain an express pro-
hibition against oral modification.
In 1949, section 33-c was greatly limited by Green v. Doniger.23
In that case, there was a written contract which stated that it could
not be "modified, altered, changed or amended" by the parties. It
was also provided that either party could terminate the contract upon
thirty days written notice. They then orally agreed to terminate the
contract, and entered into an oral agreement which contained sub-
stantially the same provisions as the original contract. The Court
of Appeals, relying on Schwartzreich v. Baunwn-Basch, Inc.,24 held
that, while the parties could not have orally modified the original
contract, they could abandon it and enter into a new one. The court
reasoned that since the termination provision in the contract was in-
consistent with section 33-c, the parties had decided not to rely on
that section to effect a termination.
Green v. Doniger was widely criticized.2 5  Three years later,
section 33-c was amended 26 to its present form.2 7  Under the amend-
ment, as before, oral change may be prohibited by the contract.28
Moreover, the contract may provide against oral termination.2 9 If
oral termination is expressly prohibited, the parties may not mutually
abandon the contract unless there is a writing signed by the party
against whom the termination agreement is sought to be enforced ao
21 See text accompanying note 16 supra.
22 1941 LEa. Doc. No. 65(M), R aPORT, N.Y. LAW REVIsIoN Coi u IssIoN
345, 359 (1941). From 1935 to 1941, parties to a sealed contract could modify
it only if the modification agreement was reduced to writing even though
unsealed. Laws of N.Y. 1935, c. 708, § 1, as amended, Laws of N.Y. 1941,
c. 329, § 2.
23 300 N.Y. 238, 90 N.E.2d 56 (1949). The case was decided by the bare
majority of one.
24231 N.Y. 196, 131 N.E. 887 (1921). See note 6 supra.
25 See 50 COLUm. L. REV. 700, 702-04 (1950); 36 CORNELL L.Q. 131,
136 (1950) ; 6 N.Y.U. INmA. L. Rv. 72, 76 (1951). But see 1 SYRAcUSE L.
REV. 517i 518-19 (1950).
26 Laws of N.Y. 1952, c. 831, § 1. The amendment was to "avert the effects
of . . . Green v. Doniger . . . , thus indicating a strong policy in favor of the
right of contracting parties who have entered into a written agreement to
eliminate oral changes . . . ... Arranbee Doll Co. v. Model Plastic Corp.,
282 App. Div. 660, 661, 122 N.Y.S.2d 137, 139 (1st Dep't 1953) (separate
mem. opinion).
27 N.Y. PErs. PROP. LAW § 33-c (Supp. 1958).
28 A partial discharge of an obligation under the contract which would
leave any obligation executory is considered to be a change. N.Y. PERs. PROP.
LAW § 33-c(3) (a) (Supp. 1958).
29 N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 33-c(2) (Supp. 1958).
so Ibid.
[ VOL. 33
or an "executed accord and satisfaction." 31 If, as in Green v.
Doniger,3 2 the contract may be unilaterally terminated only by writ-
ten notice to the other party, only a writing is sufficient to effectuate
the termination 33 Although one may ordinarily waive a contractual
right,3 4 the statute expressly states that the condition as to written
notice cannot be waived.3 5
It is to be noted that in the case of a mutual abandonment by
accord and satisfaction, the satisfaction can be anything but another
executory contract.30
At common law, if before complete performance by both parties
there had been such a breach that the innocent party could be dis-
charged, the innocent party could rescind the contract 37 either orally
or by a writing. Today, by statute,3 if a written contract expressly
provides that it can not be orally terminated, the contract cannot be
discharged by an oral executory agreement. Oral renunciation would
not apply to this situation since renunciation operates only where
there has been a breach of some duty. Section 33-c applies where
no right of action has accrued.
At common law, if there was an attempted oral modification of
a contract under seal, the parties would not be liable to the extent
that the modification remained executory. 39 The modification, how-
ever, would be operative to the extent that it was executed.4 0 Today,
if a written contract contained a provision against oral modification,
again the modification agreement would be operative to the extent
that it was executed. 41 However, it would seem that the performance
under the alleged oral modification agreement would have to be so
unequivocal so as not to be attributable to anything but the oral modi-
fication. 42 If it is so unequivocal, then the party claiming that the
oral modification was prohibited would be estopped from so claiming.43
31 Technically, this phrase is superfluous. An executed accord is a satis-
faction. See text accompanying note 66 infra.
32300 N.Y. 238, 90 N.E.2d 56 (1949).
33 N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 33-c(4) (Supp. 1958).
34 See, e.g., Thomson v. Poor, 147 N.Y. 402, 409-10, 42 N.E. 13, 15 (1895);
Catholic Foreign Mission Socy of America v. Oussani, 215 N.Y. 1, 8, 109
N.E. 80, 82 (1915) (dictum).
3 N.Y. PFRs. PROP. LAW § 33-c(4) (Supp. 1958).
36 See text accompanying note 94 infra.
37 See M. Ufland & Co. v. McMahon, 215 App. Div. 267, 269, 213 N.Y.
Supp. 519, 520 (4th Dep't 1926).
3 N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §33-c(2) (Supp. 1958).
39 See text accompanying note 16 supra.4 0Imperator Realty Co. v. Tull, 228 N.Y. 447, 127 N.E. 263 (1920);
McKenzie v. Harrison, 120 N.Y. 260, 24 N.E. 458 (1890); McCreery v. Day,
119 N.Y. 1, 23 N.E. 198 (1890).
41 B. S. Martins Corp. v. Greenmont-on-Hudson, Inc., 281 App. Div. 750,
118 N.Y.S.2d 299 (2d Dep't 1953) (mem. opinion). Accord, Alcon v. Kinton
Realty, Inc., 2 A.D.2d 454, 156 N.Y.S.2d 439 (3d Dep't 1956).
42 Bright Radio Lab., Inc. v. Coastal Commercial Corp., 4 A.D.2d 491, 166
N.Y.S.2d 906 (1st Dep't 1957).
43 See Bakhshandeh v. American Cyanamid Co., 12 M.2d 742, 744, 177
N.Y.S.2d 374, 376 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
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Discharge
An underlying principle in the area of modification and discharge
of claims is that part payment, or the promise of part payment, of a
matured and liquidated debt is insufficient to effect a discharge even
with the creditor's assent, for want of consideration to support the
creditor's promise to discharge.44 This doctrine, referred to as either
Pinnel's rule 45 or the rule in Foakes v. Beer,46 is firmly entrenched
in American jurisprudence. 47  However, it has been greatly criti-
cized 48 and narrowly limited.49 Situations not falling within the doc-
trine include payment before the debt is due,50 and payment at a
different place 51 or in a different medium than that called for by the
contract.
5 2
In 1936, section 33(2) of the New York Personal Property
Law was enacted. 53  Under this section, any discharge of a debtor
is valid even if consideration is lacking, provided that the discharge
is in writing and signed by the creditor.54  Thus, section 33(2)
changed the doctrine of Foakes v. Beer.55
If the creditor wanted to discharge the debtor, at common law
he could give him a release. A release was a discharge under seal
of an existing obligation,56 effective only upon delivery.
57
After the seal was no longer considered conclusive evidence of
consideration,58 there arose a need for a substitute for the common-
44 Foakes v. Beer, 9 A.C. 605 (H.L. 1884); Pinnel's Case, 50 Co. Rep.
117a, 77 Eng. Rep. 237 (K.B. 1602) ; see Note, 6 FORDHAM L. REv. 448, 460-61(1937).
45 Pinnel's Case, supra note 44; see POLLOCK, CONTRACTS 150 (13th ed.
1950); 1936 LEG. Doc. No. 65(D), REPORT, N.Y. LAw REVISION COMMISSION
81, 119 (1936).
46 Foakes v. Beer, supra note 44. See 1936 LEG. Doc. No., 65(D), REPORT,
N.Y. LAW REvisION COmmissIoN 81, 119 (1936); Note, 26 U. CiNc. L. REV.
626 (1957).
47 See Note, 4 VAND. L. REv. 175 (1950).
48 See, e.g., Jaffray v. Davis, 124 N.Y. 164, 167-71, 26 N.E. 351, 352-53
(1891); Notes, 4 KAN. L. REv. 128 (1955), 4 VAND. L. REV. 175 (1950).
49 WHITNEY, CONTRACTS § 53 at 133-34 (5th ed. 1953); 1936 LEG. Doc.
No. 65(D), REPORT, N.Y. LAW REviSION CommiSSION 81, 119-20 (1936); Note,
26 U. CiNc. L. REV. 626, 627-28 (1957); see Notes, 6 FORDHAM L. REv. 448,
452-53, 460 (1937), 4 VAND. L. REv. 175-76 (1950).
50 Pinnel's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 117a, 77 Eng. Rep. 237, 238 (K.B. 1602)
(dictum) ; WHITNEY, op. cit. su pra note 49, § 53 at 133.
51 Ibid.
52 Jaffray v. Davis, 124 N.Y. 164, 26 N.E. 351 (1891) ; Pinnel's Case, supra
note 50, at 237.
53 Laws of N.Y. 1936, c. 281, § 1.
54 N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 33(2).
55 See Legislation, 6 FORDHAi L. Rxv. 448, 460-61 (1937).
56 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1820 (rev. ed. 1938).
57 Ibid.
5s Laws of N.Y. 1936, c. 685, § 1.
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law release. 9 This was satisfied by the enactment of section 243
of the New York Debtor-Creditor Law, which provides that "a writ-
ten instrument... which purports to be a total or partial release...
shall not be invalid because of the absence . . . of a seal." 60
Another method whereby a creditor may discharge a debtor is
by giving him a receipt stating that all of the debt has been paid.6'
In this situation, the receipt might be deemed evidence of a gift. 62
The debtor will also be discharged if the creditor intentionally can-
cels his promissory note.63
There exists an apparent conflict between section 33(2) of the
Personal Property Law and section 243 of the Debtor-Creditor Law.
The former would effectuate a discharge upon signing. The latter,
since it is a substitute for the common-law release, would seem to be
effective only upon a delivery. 4  This gives rise to a problem as yet
unresolved, namely, the status of the debtor subsequent to a writing
discharging him, but prior to its delivery to him. However, from
the history of the two statutes, it would seem that in this situation
section 243 would apply where a cause of action has already accrued.
The application of section 33(2) would.then be limited to a modifi-
cation agreement and not to where a cause of action has already
accrued. 5 Thus, for a creditor to discharge a debtor today, a de-
livery would be needed.
Accord and Satisfaction
A debtor's obligation can also be discharged by an accord and
satisfaction. An accord has been defined as an agreement whereby
one party undertakes to give or perform, and the other to accept in
satisfaction of a claim something other than that to which he believes
himself entitled."" The execution of the accord is the satisfaction.67
The doctrine applies only where there has been a breach of some
" WHITNEY, CONTRACTS § 53, at 134 (5th ed. 1953); see 1936 LEG. Doc.
No. 65(C), REPORT, N.Y. LAW REVISION COMMISSION 65, 77-78 (1936).60 Laws of N.Y. 1936, c. 222, § 1; see Note, 14 ALBANY L. REV. 186, 188
(1950).
61 McKenzie v. Harrison, 120 N.Y. 260, 24 N.E. 458 (1890).
62 Ibid.
63 N.Y. NEGoTIABLE INSTR. LAW § 200(3).
64 1936 LEG. Doc. No. 65(C), REPORT, N.Y. LAW REVISION CoImitSSioN
65, 79 (1936). The common-law release was only effective on delivery. See
text accompanying note 57 supra.
6 1936 LEG. Doc. No. 65(C), REPORT, N.Y. LAW REVIsIoN ConmauSSioN
65, 78-79 (1936); 1936 Lr-G. Doc. No. 65(D), REPORT, N. Y. LAW REVISION
Comm[issioN 81, 159-286 (1936).
66 Reilly v. Barrett, 220 N.Y. 170, 172-73, 115 N.E. 453, 454 (1917);
6 WILLISToN, CONTRACTS § 1838 (rev. ed. 1938).
67 Ibid.
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dtity, 8 either contractual or tortious.0 9 If the creditor accepts the
satisfaction, the debtor's liability is completely extinguished.70
One problem in this area is to determine what constitutes the
satisfaction. The difficulty is to ascertain whether it is the debtor's
promise, or the performance of his promise, which will extinguish
his liability. If it is performance, a second problem arises, namely,
what is the position of the parties subsequent to the promise but prior
to the satisfaction?
In determining whether it is the debtor's promise or his per-
formance that constitutes the satisfaction, the controlling factor is
the intention of the parties.71 To aid in ascertaining their intention,
certain presumptions are indulged.7 2 Thus, if D owes C the liqui-
dated sum of 100 dollars and C promises to accept five books from D
in satisfaction, it is presumed, in the absence of a contrary intention,
that only acceptance of the five books by C will extinguish D's lia-
bility. 73 But since accord and satisfaction is subject to the doctrine
of consideration, D could not promise to pay or pay C 75 dollars. 74
On the other hand, if there were a writing signed by C discharging D
after D's promise or payment of 75 dollars, there would be a satisfac-
tion.7 5  Even if D owed C, no liquidated sum but has concededly
breached a duty to C, the performance and not the promise is pre-
sumed the satisfaction. 76 If, however, there is a bona fide dispute as
to whether D has breached any duty to C, then D's promise is pre-
sumed to be the satisfaction. 77 The debtor's promise is also presumed
to be the satisfaction if the agreement is reached in open court.78
68 6 WILLIsvoN, op. cil. supra note 66, § 1842; Shepherd, The Executory
Accord, 26 ILL. L. REv. 22 (1931).
69 Reilly v. Barrett, mupra note 66, at 173, 115 N.E. at 454 (dictum);
6 CORBiN, CONTRACTS §1276, at 88-89 (1951).
70 6 CO.BIN, CONTRACTS § 1276 at 88 (1951).
71 Blair & Co. v. Otto, 5 A.D.2d 276, 280, 171 N.Y.S.2d 203, 207 (lst Dep't
1958) ; Goldbard v. Empire State Mut. Ins. Co., 5 A.D.2d 230, 234, 171 N.Y.S.2d
194, 199 (1st Dep't 1958).
72 See Goldbard v. Empire State Mut. Ins. Co., supra note 71, at 234, 171
N.Y.S.2d at 200; RESTATEMENT, CON'TRACrS § 419 (1932).73 Accord, Kromer v. Heim, 75 N.Y. 574 (1879).
74 Goffe v. Jones, 132 App. Div. 864, 117 N.Y. Supp. 407 (1st Dep't 1909).
See Kromer v. Heim, 75 N.Y. 574 (1879); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 417,
comment c (1932); Comment, 12 ARK. L. REV. 160, 161 (1958).
75 N.Y. P.RS. PROP. LAW § 33(2).
76 Reilly v. Barrett, 220 N.Y. 170, 115 N.E. 453 (1917); Rubin v. Siegel,
181 App. Div. 181, 168 N.Y. Supp. 744 (1st Dep't 1918).
77 Ostrander v. Ostrander, 199 App. Div. 437, 191 N.Y. Supp. 470 (3d Dep't
1921).78 Yonkers Fur Dressing Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 247 N.Y. 435, 160 N.E.
778 (1928). In a recent case, the court construed the debtor's oral promise
to be the satisfaction, although the agreement was technically not made in open
court. After the opening statements had been made and the jury impanelled,
the agreement was entered into in the judge's chambers. The judge then dis-
charged the jury, and the case was stricken from the calendar. Langlois v.
Langlois, 5 A.D.2d 75, 78, 169 N.Y.S.2d 170, 174 (3d Dep't 1957), 9 SYRAcusE
L. REV. 341, 343-44 (1958).
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There are also borderline cases as to what constitutes the satis-
faction. In Moers v. Moers,79 the agreement settled all the differ-
ences between the parties. The debtor's promise was held to be the
satisfaction. The case has been interpreted as holding that if all the
differences between the parties are included in the agreement, a pre-
sumption arises that the debtor's promise itself was intended as the
satisfaction.8 0 However, it would seem that in the Moers case, the
intention of the parties was manifestly that the debtor's promise be
the satisfaction.8
1
At common law, if the creditor had agreed to accept the promise
of new performance as the satisfaction, the promise itself would have
discharged the debtor's original obligation. 2 The creditor's cause
of action on the original obligation would be extinguished. 3 If there
had been a bilateral agreement under which the creditor would accept
the new performance, until he did accept it the debtor's obligation on
the original claim still remained. This is the executory accord.
84
Anytime before the creditor accepted the new performance, he could
refuse to do so and bring an action on the original claim.8 5 The
debtor's obligation on the original claim would remain even if the
creditor had accepted part of the new performance 8 6 and even if the
debtor was willing to tender the full performance.87 The same would
79229 N.Y. 294, 128 N.E. 202 (1920).
so See Blair & Co. v. Otto, 5 A.D.2d 276, 281, 171 N.Y.S.2d 203, 207-08
(Ist Dep't 1958); 1937 LEG. Doc. No. 65(K), REPoRT, N.Y. LAW RVISION
ConmfissI6N 201, 219 n.24 (1937).
81 "It [the agreement] .. . makes manifest the intention of the parties that
the original action and all disputes and controversies between them were merged
into it." Moers v. Moers, 229 N.Y. 294, 301-02, 128 N.E. 202, 204 (1920).
82 Moers v. Moers, supra note 81; Morehouse v. Second Nat'! Bank, 98
N.Y. 527 (1885); Hartwig v. American Malting Co., 74 App. Div. 140, 77
N.Y. Supp. 533 (1st Dep't 1902). Much confusion in the area of accord and
satisfaction is due to the diversity of language. For example, the above situa-
tion has been variously referred to as an executed bilateral accord [see 1937
LEG. Doc. No. 65(K), REPORT, N.Y. LAW REVSION ColmuIssioN 201, 212-13,
218 (1937)] ; sometimes as a superseding agreement [see Langlois v. Langlois,
5 A.D.2d 75, 77, 169 N.Y.S.2d 170, 173 (3d Dep't 1957); Atterbury v. James
F. Walsh Paper Corp., 261 App. Div. 529, 531, 26 N.Y.S.2d 43, 45 (1st Dep't),
aff'd mewn., 286 N.Y. 578, 35 N.E.2d 928 (1941), 16 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 126
(1941)]; sometimes as an accord [see RESTATEUENT, CONMRACTS §418
(1932)] ; and sometimes as a compromise [see Reilly v. Barrett, 220 N.Y. 170,
173, 115 N.E. 453, 454 (1917)].
83 Morehouse v. Second Nat'l Bank, supra note 82, at 533.
84 Ford v. Beech, 11 Q.B. 852, 116 Eng. Rep. 693 (Ex. 1848); see Allen
v. Harris, I Ld. Raym. 122, 91 Eng. Rep. 978 (K.B. 1701); Shepherd, The
Executory Accord, 26 ILL. L. REv. 22, 25 (1931).
S5 Larscy v. Hogan & Sons, Inc., 239 N.Y. 298, 146 N.E. 430 (1925) ; Reilly
v. Barrett, 220 N.Y. 170, 115 N.E. 453 (1917); see Rubin v. Siegel, 181 App.
Div. 181, 168 N.Y. Supp. 744 (1st Dep't 1918).
86 Larscy v. Hogan & Sons, Inc., supra note 85, at 301, 146 N.E. at 431;
see Reilly v. Barrett, supra note 85, at 173, 115 N.E. at 454.
87 Kromer v. Heim, 75 N.Y. 574 (1879) ; see Noe v. Christie, 51 N.Y. 270
(1873).
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be true if the creditor offered to accept the new performance when
the debtor tendered it, as in a unilateral contract. 88
Today in New York, the debtor's promise can be taken as the
satisfaction, and is valid even though oral.89 But whenever perfor-
mance is intended as satisfaction, if the agreement is in writing it can
be used by the debtor as the basis of an action, counterclaim, or
defense. 90 If, however, the debtor defaults on the agreement, the
creditor can bring an action, at his option, on either the original claim
or the new agreement. 91
If a written contract provides that it cannot be terminated orally,
section 33-c states that one of the two ways that it may be termi-
nated is by an "executed accord and satisfaction." 92 Thus, the parties
may enter into an agreement which, under ordinary circumstances,
would give rise to an accord and satisfaction. 93 The general rules
of accord and satisfaction are, however, modified to the extent that
the parties cannot make another "executory agreement" the satis-
faction.94 If an executory agreement could be the satisfaction, one
party could claim that the parties had mutually abandoned the con-
tract and entered into another one on substantially the same terms.
He could thus argue that an accord and satisfaction had been reached.
Where the debtor owes the liquidated sum of 100 dollars, if he
gives his negotiable instrument for 75 dollars the debt is not dis-
charged 95 unless the instrument itself is accepted as the satisfaction. 0
Otherwise, the debtor's negotiable instrument is presumed to be ac-
cepted as conditional and not as absolute payment.97
However, assume there is a bona fide dispute as to the amount
of the debt. The creditor claims the debt is 100 dollars and the
debtor claims it is 75 dollars. The debtor can send the creditor a
75-dollar check with the condition "in full payment of my debt" writ-
ten on the check or in an accompanying letter. If the creditor cashes
the check, the debtor is discharged.98 The creditor cannot cross out
88 Ibid.
89 See Langlois v. Langlois, 5 A.D.2d 75, 78, 169 N.Y.S.2d 170, 174 (3d
Dep't 1957).9 0 N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAW §§ 33-a, 33-b.
91 N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 33-a (3).92 N.Y. PEaS. PROP. LAW § 33-c (Supp. 1958).
93 Singer v. Slatex, Inc., 166 N.Y.S.2d 108 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1957) (per
curiam).
94 N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 33-c(2) (Supp. 1958).
95 Shanley v. Koehler, 80 App. Div. 566, 80 N.Y. Supp. 679 (1st Dep't
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v. Padden, 248 N.Y. 243, 162 N.E. 20 (1928). "The debtor may be wrong in
his contention. That he honestly believes in the correctness of his position is
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the condition, cash the check, and then bring an action for the remain-
ing 25 dollars.99 However, it no condition is attached, the creditor
can cash the check and then bring an action for the 25 dollars.'00
In such a case, the 75 dollars becomes a payment on account.1 1
But if the debtor admittedly owed the 100 dollars, at common law
the creditor could cross out the condition and sue for the remaining 25
dollars. 10 2 Today in Pape v. Rudolph Bros., Inc.,103 the same result
has been reached even with section 33(2) and section 243. Since the
creditor had not crossed out the writing, the debtor claimed that the
words on the check constituted a written release under section 243.104
The Appellate Division held that the indorsement on the back of the
check by the creditor did not constitute such a release.10 5 No reasons
were given for the holding.1 6 However, even if the creditor had
crossed out the condition, the debtor would not be discharged. 1°7
Since a release is a consensual transaction, the crossing out of the
condition would negative a consent to the release.
Conclusion
At common law in New York, the intention of the parties at-
tempting to effect a discharge or modification was often thwarted by
the doctrines of the seal and of consideration. The courts gave para-
mount importance to historical rules which bore little or no relation
to socio-economic reality. The doctrines of consideration and the
seal have been whittled away in the area of modification and discharge
of claims as in other areas of contract law. If the parties clearly
attempt to bring themselves within the statutory protection, their in-
tention should not be frustrated by technical rules. The statutes
should be liberally construed to effectuate the purpose for which they
were enacted, namely, the abolition of such technical rules and the
fulfilling of the parties' intention.
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